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The Cancer Drug Fund was originally conceived as a temporary
measure, until value based pricing for drugs was introduced, to
give NHS cancer patients access to drugs not approved byNICE.
Spending on these drugs rose from less than the £50m (€63m;
$79m) budgeted for the first year in 2010-11 to well over £200m
in 2013-14, and the budget for the scheme—now extended for
a further two years—will reach £280m by 2016.1 The recent
changes to the fund recognise the impossibility, within any
sensible budget limit, of providing all the new cancer drugs that
offer possible benefit to patients. More radical changes are
needed to the working of the fund, given the failure to introduce
value based pricing, so that it deals with the underlying problem
of inadequate information on the effectiveness and cost
effectiveness of new cancer drugs when used in the NHS.
A recent The BMJ briefing identified major problems with the
fund.2 The opportunity costs in terms of the treatments that
cannot, as a result, be afforded elsewhere in the NHS are
substantial, with consequent decrements to other patients’ health.
Its operation undermines the role of the National Institute for
Health and Care Excellence (NICE). A rejection from NICE on
the grounds that a drug is not cost effective (at the price
proposed by the company) means little if the NHS funds it
anyway through the Cancer Drug Fund. The fund’s existence
means that companies have no incentive to compromise on list
price, offer a patient access scheme that would justify a NICE
recommendation, or conduct further research.
Following its recent consultation the fund has proposed several
reforms. It will introduce a rationing process that will use a
more limited categorisation of the additional benefit (principally
in terms of survival) and the cost (simply that of the drug) to
prioritise the drugs on its list so that the fund remains within
budget.2 In other words, it will do a crude reassessment of the
cost effectiveness of the drug—something that NICE has already
assessed and found unacceptable. This process will continue to
undermine NICE, duplicate effort, and distort allocation of NHS
resources while failing to support the development of cost
effective drugs from which patients could benefit.
A better process is needed. We propose that the fund should
focus on those cancer drugs that may be cost effective but for
which current evidence is insufficient. The process could be as
follows:
• NICE considers new drugs as at present
• It identifies cancer drugs for which evidence is too
uncertain for a positive recommendation but further
research might show they are cost effective3
• These drugs are considered by a joint NICE-NHS England
group that, with expert advice, decides whether at the
manufacturer’s price, further research is feasible and would
justify its cost
• The group also decides whether in the meantime the drug
should be generally available through the Cancer Drug
Fund or only to patients involved in the research
• When the research is complete, NICE would reappraise
the evidence and decide whether the drug should now be
recommended as cost effective
• If, as is likely, the number of drugs suitable for further
research still exceeded the capacity for funding,
prioritisation would be on the basis of the potential value
to the NHS of the additional research.
As well as cancer experts, the joint NICE-NHS England group
would need to include methods specialists, who could ensure
that any proposed data collection—whether from observational
studies or a formal randomised trial—obtained the maximum
evidential value from using the drug. This evidence generation
would need to be a serious and feasible exercise not simply an
excuse to start using the drug, as arguably occurred with new
treatments for multiple sclerosis.4 5
The fund would cover the costs of the drugs, with a flexible
pricing agreement.6 The additional costs of the research, which
if it is to be robust may be substantial, would need to come from
other sources. The presumption should be that the manufacturer
should fund and, where feasible, undertake the research because
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it is designed to show that the drug is cost effective at the
company’s price. Other possible sources for these research funds
include the pharmaceutical industry as a whole through the
rebated income from companies under the current
Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme7; NHS funds allocated
to research through the National Institute for Health Research,
and other sources of research funding intended to encourage
and support pharmaceutical innovation. If the public sector
funds the research, it would need to be clear how the NHS shares
the return on that investment, which would obviously be linked
to the price it pays for the products.
This would not be an easy process, and there are many details
that would need to be agreed. However, by helping to identify
those promising cancer drugs for which more research could
reduce the uncertainty about cost effectiveness, the Cancer Drug
Fund would support a rational revised process. This could
prioritise the funding of cancer drugs to serve not just today’s
cancer patients but all patients seeking care from the NHS in
the short and longer term.
Logically such a process should not be limited to cancer drugs,
but if its value could be shown for cancer there is no reason why
its remit and funding could not be extended in the future. The
UK life sciences minister has just launched a “wide ranging
review of the way new drugs andmedical devices are developed
and adopted in the UK”8 with the intention of speeding up
clinical trials and NHS patient access to new treatments. Such
a review should consider an extended role for the process we
suggest.
Competing interests: We have read and understood BMJ policy on
declaration of interests and declare the following potentially relevant
interests: MB and LL have been members of a NICE Technology
Appraisal Committee which through the NICE Technology Appraisal
Programme provides guidance to the NHS including on drug
reimbursement. MB has been member of NICE’s steering group for
value based assessment and a member of a panel providing advice to
NICE’s Early Scientific Advice Programme. LL has received research
grants from drug companies and from NICE. MB and MS have been
members of various ad hoc advisory boards for drug companies,
including those sponsoring cancer drugs. JR has been a member of an
ad hoc advisory group for a drug company. MS has undertaken paid
consultancy for drug companies, including those sponsoring cancer
drugs. AT is director of Office of Health Economics, which receives
funding from the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry and
undertakes research and consulting work for drug companies. He was
also a member of NICE’s value based assessment working group.
Provenance and peer review: Commissioned; not externally peer
reviewed.
1 Appleby J. The Cancer Drugs Fund: inequitable and inefficient? www.kingsfund.org.uk/
blog/2014/09/cancer-drugs-fund-inequitable-and-inefficient.
2 Jack A. Which way now for the Cancer Drugs Fund? BMJ 2014;349:g5524.
3 NHS England. Standard operating procedures: the Cancer Drugs Fund (CDF). 2014.
www.england.nhs.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/sop-cdf-1114.pdf.
4 Claxton K, Palmer SJ, Longworth L, Bojke L, Griffin S, McKenna C,et al. Informing a
decision framework for when NICE should recommend the use of health technologies
only in the context of an appropriately designed programme of evidence development.
Health Technol Assess 2012;16:1-342.
5 Raftery J. Multiple sclerosis risk sharing scheme: a costly failure. BMJ 2010;340:c1672.
6 Garrison LP Jr, Towse A, Briggs A, de Pouvourville G, Grueger J, Mohr PE, et al.
Performance-based risk-sharing arrangements-good practices for design, implementation,
and evaluation: report of the ISPOR good practices for performance-based risk-sharing
arrangements task force. Value Health 2013;16:703-19.
7 Department of Health, Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry. The
Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme 2014. www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/282523/Pharmaceutical_Price_Regulation.pdf.
8 Ward A. UK life sciences minister races to boost medicines. Financial Times 2014 Nov
23. www.ft.com/cms/s/0/b0289044-7173-11e4-818e-00144feabdc0.html.
Cite this as: BMJ 2014;349:g7276
© BMJ Publishing Group Ltd 2014
For personal use only: See rights and reprints http://www.bmj.com/permissions Subscribe: http://www.bmj.com/subscribe
BMJ 2014;349:g7276 doi: 10.1136/bmj.g7276 (Published 28 November 2014) Page 2 of 2
EDITORIALS
